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Abstract 
This paper explores what lessons we can learn from the experiences of states that 
instituted NCLB-like accountability systems prior to 2001 (here called first-
generation accountability systems). We looked at the experiences of three smaller 
states (Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina), four larger ones (California, Florida, 
New York, Texas), and two large districts (Chicago and Philadelphia). We analyzed 
evaluative reports and policy documents as well as interviews with state officials 
and researchers. We condensed the material into eight lessons: sanctions are not 
the fallback solution; no single strategy has been universally successful; staging 
should be handled with flexibility; intensive capacity building is necessary; a 
comprehensive set of strategies seems promising; relationship-building needs to 
                                                 
1 This article is based on two CRESST Technical Reports (Mintrop & Papazian, 2003; Mintrop & 
Trujillo, 2004). 
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complement powerful programs; competence reduces conflict; and strong state 
commitment is needed to create system capacity.  
Keywords: corrective action, accountability, No Child Left Behind. 
Introduction 
According to NCLB, states are to create accountability systems by formulating standards, 
testing students regularly, defining a baseline, and setting a level of proficiency from 2001 
performance levels. Schools are required to attain adequate yearly progress (AYP) towards 
proficiency. AYP can vary from year to year, but all schools need to have reached proficiency for 
100 percent of their students by the school year 2013–14. Schools that lag behind are subject to an 
intervention process constructed in three stages: improvement, corrective action, and restructuring. 
When a school fails to make AYP two years in a row, it enters the improvement stage. Schools in 
this stage engage in a process of internal school renewal. They write a school improvement plan and 
implement effective programs, comprehensive school improvement models, and extended services. 
Districts are required to provide assistance. A school can contract with third-party providers. Parents 
have the option to enroll their children in another school and upon the school’s failure to make 
AYP in the first improvement year, parents have the right to enroll their children in tutoring services 
provided by the district or other organizations. If schools fail to make AYP yet another year, they 
enter the stage of corrective action during which district intervention intensifies. Among other 
measures, staff can be removed, curricula mandated, management authority revoked, and 
instructional time extended. Should a school linger and fail to make AYP yet one more year, major 
restructuring is to occur via reconstitution, state takeover, conversion into a charter, transfer to a 
private management company and other, similarly radical measures. Thus, a school that fails to 
improve for five consecutive years ceases to exist in its original form according to NCLB. Districts 
encounter a similar staged approach. When they fail to make district AYP for two consecutive years, 
they enter the improvement stage that primarily entails programmatic changes. After another two 
years of missing AYP, they are subject to corrective action that may severely curtail their authority.  
This paper concentrates on the stage of corrective action and further restructuring. We 
summarize what lessons might be gleaned from first-generation accountability systems for this stage. 
Under NCLB, states and districts may soon face the burden of increasing numbers of schools that 
failed to improve under the softer touch of probation and school improvement. For some states, the 
NCLB three-stage approach to low-performing schools is novel. But other state governments acted 
prior to federal legislation. Some jurisdictions identified quite a substantial number of low 
performing schools, and some states have moved on to more forceful interventions in schools and 
districts. Although most of these earlier first-generation high-stakes systems echo the structures of 
NCLB in its basic format, they differ widely in their repercussions for identified low performing 
schools and districts (Rudo, 2001). States implementing NCLB or aligning their existing 
accountability system to NCLB can learn from these variations. Insights from first-generation 
systems can help avoid less promising design features or suggest likely trajectories for certain system 
designs.     
The Research 
We looked at three smaller states (Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina) and four larger ones 
(California, Florida, New York, Texas). These seven states constitute the main body of our research. 
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We also looked at Chicago’s and Philadelphia’s approach to low-performing schools. We selected 
these systems for five reasons: they are first-generation systems that have spearheaded high stakes 
accountability in the U.S.; have been in existence for some time; have figured prominently in the 
public discussion on high stakes accountability prior to NCLB; have gained experiences with 
corrective action and school redesign; and are covered by some research material. Not all five criteria 
applied to all jurisdictions. 
We asked about the following issues associated with accountability: the kinds of initiatives, 
programs, or policies undertaken with regard to schools with persistently low test scores that failed 
the first stage of intervention; the scale on which these programs operated; which set of actors 
(teachers, school administrators, districts) were the recipients of interventions; how pressures and 
sanctions were used; what kind of capacity building was provided; what management structures 
states or districts used for the provision of these services; what evidence of success that might exist; 
and what lessons could be gleaned from answers to these questions for states that are in the process 
of designing corrective action or school redesign programs. 
Our data are studies, papers, reports, and information from web sites, and we relied on 
interviews and personal communication with officials to fill gaps.2 Although we now have reports on 
the impact of high-stakes testing on schools in several states, systematic evaluations of low-
performing schools programs are rare, and of corrective action initiatives even more so.3 Our 
descriptive analysis cannot compensate for this lack. It is generally very difficult to determine the 
effectiveness of a given program, even more so the effectiveness of a particular design element. 
Many factors mediate the influence of a particular state or district policy on school performance, 
including the local context, the specific mixture of interventions, or the time allotted for 
improvement. It is even more difficult to assess the effectiveness of a specific program relative to 
other differently structured programs without a common metric that would allow us to compare in a 
straightforward way.  
Given these limitations, we cannot evaluate states’ and districts’ corrective action efforts, but 
we can do more than merely describe design features. We refrained from burdening the reader with 
too much descriptive information.4 Rather, we concentrate on lessons learned. We hope that our 
overview may help systematize and categorize the states’ various strategies and their consequences. 
In this way, we hope to foster an informed discussion about corrective action and school redesign 
based on previous experiences.   
Commonalities and Differences across Systems 
Across the states and districts, the following elements, in varied combinations, are most 
frequently associated with corrective action and school redesign: school improvement grants, 
                                                 
2 We conducted background interviews with individuals from the following organizations: Baltimore 
City Public School System; California Department of Education; The Center for Urban School Policy; The 
Charles A. Dana Center; Florida Department of Education; Johns Hopkins University; Kentucky Department 
of Education; Maryland State Department of Education; New York State Department of Education; North 
Carolina Department of Public Instruction; NYU’s Institute for Education and Social Policy; Research for 
Action in Philadelphia; School District of Philadelphia; Texas A & M University; Texas Education Agency;  
and WestEd. 
3 For examples of evaluations of high stakes testing policies, see Herman (2004); Koretz and Barron 
(1998); Stecher, Barron, Chun, and Ross (2000); and Stecher, Barron, Kaganoff, and Goodwin (1998). 
4 For a good descriptive report, see Council of Chief State School Officers (2003). 
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professional development, new instructional materials, programmatic prescriptions (e.g., pacing 
plans, structured reading and math programs), new or extension of existing services (e.g., summer 
school, extended day, after-school), on-site instructional specialists, evaluations or audits, 
intervention teams or individual change agents, bureaucratic pressures (e.g., reassignment of 
teachers, principals, external monitors, increased oversight), market pressures (vouchers, school 
choice, student reassignment, magnet schools), school reorganizations or reconstitutions, teacher 
recruitment incentives, teacher quality policies, school construction and repair programs, and 
changes of governance and authority (e.g., special districts, educational management organizations, 
charters, school takeover, district takeover).  
Although NCLB creates some uniformity in states’ approaches to low performance by 
demanding adequate yearly progress towards a proficiency ceiling, the rigor of performance 
demands and intervention burdens differ across states. These differences influence the chances of 
persistently low-testing schools to improve and for corrective action and redesign to be successful. 
Some systems put high demands on schools by either testing student achievement with cognitively 
complex tests or by expecting growth that was set according to an ambitious performance ceiling. 
Others took a more moderated approach. They used, for example, basic skills tests that only 
challenge schools at the lower end of the spectrum, or they set flexible growth targets that are 
adjusted to the system’s current real growth. Some systems only entered schools into the low 
performing schools program that were rock-bottom performers, others identified schools on various 
absolute performance levels that missed their growth targets. Programs differed on what kind of 
growth it took for a school to exit the program and to shed the low performance label. Moreover, 
some accountability systems had implemented vigorous district accountability, others had not 
(Mintrop & Papazian, 2003).  
These mechanisms produce low performing schools programs with different improvement 
challenges and on different scales. These differences also entail varying numbers of schools that fail 
the first stage of school improvement and are in need of further corrective action. Programs with 
relatively high performance demands that identify large numbers of schools in the lowest 
performing category face a higher burden than programs with modest instructional demands that 
keep their operational scale low. Generally speaking, apart from a program’s initial stages when the 
load of identified schools can be up to a fourth of all schools (e.g., Kentucky), first generation 
accountability systems kept the scale of their programs fairly modest (between 2 and 4 percent), 
California being the exception. 
 
Table 1  
Differences between percent of students scoring proficient on NAEP and state tests (2003) 
CALIFORNIA TEXAS KENTUCKY Grade/subject NAEP State Gap NAEP State Gap NAEP State Gap
4th gr. Reading 21 39 18 27 85 58 31 62 31 
8th gr. Reading 22 30 8 26 88 62 34 57 23 
4th gr. Math 25 45 20 33 87 54 22 38 16 
8th gr. Math 22 30 8 25 72 47 24 31 7 
Note : Figures from Education Week , Jan. 6, 2005.  
 
NCLB leaves it up to the states to define test rigor and proficiency levels, though the federal 
NAEP (National Assessment of Educational Progress) tests function as a benchmark that states are 
to strive for. Tables 1 and 2 show how testing rigor fundamentally structures a state’s challenge and 
intervention burden. 
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Table 2 
Numbers of schools in need of improvement based on AYP (2003–04) 
Statistic CALIFORNIA TEXAS KENTUCKY 
N 1,626 199 130 
Percent ~20% ~6% ~12% 
Note : Figures from Education Week , Jan. 6, 2005.  
 
States, such as California, with high testing rigor in combination with challenging 
demographic conditions produce an enormous intervention burden while states with less rigorous 
tests and more lenient definitions of proficiency, such as Texas, face a relatively modest challenge. 
Kentucky is a state with medium testing rigor and correspondingly a medium intervention burden.  
The following lessons apply to states with performance goals in at least the medium range.  
Lessons Learned 
Although we lack research or evaluation reports about schools under corrective action or 
redesign that warrant definitive claims as to the effectiveness of particular strategies or designs, we 
can nevertheless glean a number of lessons, cautionary in nature, from the various states and 
districts we analyzed.  
Sanctions and Increasing Pressures Are Not the Fallback Solution  
Pressure and the threat of more severe sanctions were a conspicuous feature of low-
performing schools programs when high-stakes accountability systems first came into existence in 
the 1990s. Such systems, relatively undeveloped in the area of support and capacity building, unduly 
relied on the power of sanctions as fallback solutions. Schools could encounter relatively mild public 
stigma due to the negative performance label imposed on them, more intense scrutiny from review 
and evaluation teams, more administrative requirements, such as the writing of a school 
improvement plan, or more severe sanctions. Practically all of the sanctions suggested by NCLB 
have been on the books or been tried by the first-generation systems examined here, though each 
system’s mix may differ from NCLB. In California, principals and teachers were threatened to be 
reassigned. Schools could be taken over by the state. They could be reorganized, closed, or assigned 
to the management of another educational or non-profit institution. Parents could select a different 
public school or apply for charter school status (“PSAA,” 1999). State takeover was the most severe 
sanction in the Maryland system (MSDE, 2001). Public hearings, appointment of a special on-site 
monitor or master, and eventual school closure were envisaged by the Texas regulations as sanctions 
(“PSSA,” 1995). Assignment of an instructional officer, external partner, removal of the principal, 
and school reconstitution (i.e. staff reassignment and reorganization) figured prominently in the 
Chicago system (Hess, 2003). Redesign and closure were also primary sanctions in the New York 
SURR program (Brady, 2003; NYSED, 2002b). Kentucky and North Carolina added penalties to 
this list that touch individual teachers more severely (Holdzkom, 2001; Ladd & Zelli, 2001; SERVE, 
2001).  Teachers in low performing schools were evaluated and could be required to take a general 
knowledge competency test in North Carolina (Manzo, 1998); in Kentucky, as well, they could be 
evaluated with the possibility of transfer, demotion, or dismissal (David, Coe, & Kannapel, 2003). 
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But these sanctions were very rarely imposed and their centrality faded over time. Kentucky 
is a good example. The original language of schools “in decline” and “in crisis” was replaced by 
schools “in need of assistance” (David et al., 2003). Only the lowest-performing schools (30 out of 
the 90 schools “in need of assistance” in 2001) were required to accept assistance. The other 60 had 
the option to participate. The state-appointed Distinguished Educators, who initially combined 
technical assistance and probation management in their role, were renamed Highly Skilled Educators 
and shed their evaluative function (David, Kannapel, & McDiarmid, 2000). Actual imposition of 
final sanctions has been a negligible feature in Kentucky.  
In Texas, more severe sanctions akin to the level of corrective action were used very 
sparingly. In 2002, there were seven schools under the supervision of a monitor who has little 
authority, and two schools under the supervision of a master who has authority over the local 
district (TEA, 2002). The state has reconstituted only a handful of schools (Ferguson, 2000). Texas 
primarily relies on the threat of bad publicity to motivate districts and schools to improve 
performance (Izumi & Evers, 2002; Skrla, Scheurich, Johnson, & Koschoreck, 2003). Likewise in 
Maryland, after five years of high stakes accountability, the state finally took over four schools and 
assigned them to private management organizations (MSDE, 2001; CCSSO, 2003).  
In New York and Chicago, more severe sanctions played a greater role. Within New York’s 
Schools Under Registration Review (SURR) program, affecting primarily New York City, some 35 
schools have been closed since the inception of the program (NYSED, 2002a). In Chicago, 7 high 
schools were reconstituted in the 1997/98 school year, but this has not been repeated (Hess, 2003). 
Moreover, school principals are now receiving training and support from an area instructional 
officer making the original probation manager superfluous.5 
When the present California accountability system was designed, the turn from pressure to 
support that earlier accountability systems seemed to have undergone was evident. The California 
program already began with voluntary participation of qualifying schools, though in actuality most 
schools were ‘volunteered’ by their districts (O'Day & Bitter, 2003). Schools selected into the 
program accepted increased scrutiny and accountability from the state in return for funds usable for 
capacity building at the site (Posnick-Goodwin, 2003). Although large proportions of eligible schools 
that chose not to apply were left out, those that did enroll pinned their hopes for improvement on 
additional support. The threat of further sanctions was a mere background feature of the program, 
according to O’Day and Bitter (2003) as well as data collection by the author. When fewer schools 
than envisioned met their growth targets, the state refrained from building up pressure. It readjusted 
growth expectations and added additional intervention layers preceding more severe sanctions. In 
this way, out of the first cohort of 430 schools accepted into the program, the state identified merely 
24 schools that required this additional intermediate intervention when only about a fourth met the 
state’s original performance demands. 
Why this turn from pressure to support?  Some suspect that states shrink from the 
responsibility and political costs that the heavy hand of sanctions entails (Brady, 2003). This is one 
plausible explanation, but other research suggests that, political costs notwithstanding, the pressure 
strategy is a double-edged sword and not as promising as perhaps originally perceived.  The few that 
are available speak to a number of reasons: 
The results of more severe sanctions and the implementation of major school 
redesigns as envisioned by state regulation have shown to be inconclusive (ECS, 
2002, p. 6).  
                                                 
5 For a detailed description of Chicago’s recent incorporation of the Area Instructional Officers into 
the district accountability system, see Chicago Public Schools (2002) available at:   
http://edplan.cps.k12.il.us/pdfs/cps_education_plan.pdf.  
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Educating children is a highly complex task, but high-stakes accountability 
systems usually privilege very few performance indicators, often one central test 
for instructional performance. Forcing teachers to severely narrow the scope of 
their work creates serious acceptability problems for the state assessments. As a 
result, the educational meaningfulness of accountability systems among pressured 
teachers is low, and teachers reject the system as an intrinsic motivator for their 
work (Mintrop, 2003).   
 
Heightened pressure exacerbates already severe teacher commitment problems in 
many low-performing schools. Many low-performing schools are not attractive 
work places, and under current labor market conditions, schools in many 
jurisdictions with high concentrations of low-performing schools are staffed with 
large numbers of new, often insufficiently trained teachers with low commitment 
to stay. Likewise, principal turn-over is high as well. Principals under pressure of 
accountability often act as conduits of pressure making for unsupportive working 
relationships between teachers and administration. Thus, too much pressure may 
lead to dissatisfaction, exit, or additional organizational fragmentation (Mintrop, 
2004, p. 66). 
 
Identifying low performing schools has put the spotlight on glaring capacity 
deficits in these schools that a motivation strategy alone cannot remedy. This in 
turn brings issues of fairness and attribution to the fore. When schools and 
teachers feel forced to assume responsibility for critical conditions of student 
performance over which they lack authority and control, they may reject 
accountability altogether, rather than assume responsibility for their contribution. 
In this case accountability becomes counterproductive and de-motivating (Malen, 
Croninger, Muncey, & Jones, 2002, p. 120).  
In sum, in order for accountability systems to work as proper incentive systems, they must 
appeal to the “better parts” of the profession. High performing teachers and administrators in 
low-performing schools, in existence in most low-performing schools, are indispensable for a 
successful reform strategy, and such personnel ought to consider accountability demands as a 
lever to pull lower performing teachers along. But unduly intensifying pressures and sanctions 
tend to create defensiveness and turn off the very people on whose willingness, if not idealism, 
states and districts need to rely.  
Thus, in their majority, first generation states have either rarely used or turned away from 
high pressure as a main lever to motivate teachers. Instead they came to emphasize mild pressure as 
a means to motivate educators to improve performance. By contrast, under NCLB, schools may face 
severe sanctions in a rather short time, and voluntary participation is excluded as an option. If 
experiences of the first-generation accountability systems are any indication, states are advised not to 
rely too much on the power of pressures to get the job done, that is, not to depend on sanctions as a 
fallback solution. Rather, states need to construct powerful low performing schools programs that 
make corrective action and school redesign an uncommon occurrence. Such programs place heavy 
emphasis on support and intervention, bolster commitment of teachers to low-performing schools, 
and strongly motivate educators. Such accountability systems set goals that are deemed realistic, use 
assessments that are educationally meaningful (i.e. deemed valid and fair), facilitate school 
evaluations that allow schools to see their contribution to the performance problem, offer 
suggestions on how schools can improve, and identify those barriers of performance that district 
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and state policies are called to remedy (Mintrop & Papazian, 2003). Ultimately, such systems need to 
appeal to the values of “the better parts of the profession.”  
No Single Strategy Has Been Universally Successful 
A number of strategies have been tried for corrective action and school redesign, but 
evidence shows that their effect is far from conclusive (Brady, 2003).  
Reconstitution. In California, previously locally reconstituted schools in the city of San 
Francisco showed up again on the state’s low-performing schools list and one is actually slated for 
corrective action again (author’s analysis). In Maryland, some local reconstitutions actually 
exacerbated schools’ capacity problems, reduced schools’ social stability, and did not lead to the 
hoped for improvements, although a number of schools also benefited from the fresh start (Malen 
et al., 2002). Results from Chicago’s reconstitutions were inconclusive as well. Fundamentally, staff 
replacements were not necessarily of higher quality than the original teaching staff, and in many 
schools teacher morale plummeted (Hess, 2003). In New York’s SURR program corrective action 
and redesign were used more vigorously. Almost fifty schools were reconstituted (ECS, 2002). More 
than a tenth of the schools were closed. Some schools benefited, yet only about half (153) of the 
SURR schools have exited the program successfully so far (Brady, 2003; NYSED, 2003). 
Educational management organizations. Maryland took over four schools from the 
Baltimore City school district and passed them on to two educational management organizations 
(EMOs) (MSDE, 2001c). Under one of the EMOs, only one of its three schools saw consistent 
gains, one performed unevenly, and one was not improving. In Philadelphia, we have higher 
numbers of schools that were taken over. One fourth of all district schools were taken over, with 46 
managed by different external management organizations and 21 by the district’s newly created 
Office of Restructured Schools. Here, each provider offers different models of intervention 
(Travers, 2003a). Preliminary data suggest that the quality and content of the interventions may 
differ substantially and that the schools managed by the district’s own Office of Restructured 
Schools may have achieved greater gains than schools managed by EMOs (Useem, 2005). Takeover 
by EMOs coincided with soaring resignations and teacher turnover in affected schools (Neild & 
Spiridakis, 2002; Neild, Useem, Travers, & Lesnick, 2003). It also resulted in miscommunication and 
in some cases overwhelm by principals who felt like they were serving two masters—the EMO and 
the central office (Blanc, 2003; Bulkley, Mundell, & Riffer, 2004). Thus, takeover by management 
companies has helped in some cases, but is not universally positive.6  
A recent multi-state study by the Brown Center at the Brookings Institution finds that 
schools taken over by EMOs (and run as charter schools) tend to score much lower than their 
district-administered counterparts, but outscore regular public schools on test score gains (The 
Brown Center, 2003). The authors suggest that EMO charters’ low test scores are explained by the 
fact that EMOs tend to take over the lowest performing schools, but the data are not conclusive on 
this point. 
External partners. This feature was widely used in Chicago where each school on probation 
(i.e. still in the improvement stage) was assigned an external partner (Hess, 2003). Originally, external 
partners developed their own models of intervention, but disparities in the quality of services 
concerned the district (O'Day & Finnigan, 2003). In time, the district came to place stronger 
emphasis on reading, forcing external partners to adapt their work in the schools to meet these 
literacy goals. Analysts stated that some partners added superficial reading strategies to their 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of one EMO’s uneven results, see Bracey (2002). 
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intervention. This compromised their original model and made them less effective. On the other 
hand, in reconstituted schools (i.e. those undergoing corrective action) about half of the teaching 
force found their external partner useful in formulating a shared vision and offering new techniques 
and strategies after having worked with them for a number of years (Hess, 2003). But an inherent 
problem in external partner models is the lack of focus on state or district goals and the uneven 
quality of provided consultant services.7  
Charters. While the research base on charter schools is expanding, little is known about 
charter school conversion as a means of corrective action and school redesign.8 Available data seem 
to suggest that converting district-administered schools into charter schools has had uneven results. 
A multi-state study by the Brown Center on American Education shows that generally charter 
schools lag behind, or are similar to, regular public schools in absolute performance and gains from 
year to year (The Brown Center, 2003). Charter schools also tend to show up on states’ lists of 
failing schools in larger proportions than regular public schools. Schools that are converted from 
district-administered status to charter status are an exception. In the Brown Center study, 
conversion charters scored more highly than their public school counterparts and start-up charters. 
The authors point out, however, that conversion charters tend not to be corrective action schools, 
but schools that are let go by their districts as a form of reward for solid performance, although solid 
data on this point are missing. Early anecdotal evidence from Philadelphia suggests that charter 
school conversion without the benefit of an external provider model may be the least successful 
conversion of the ones tried there.9 
District takeovers. State takeovers of entire districts have also produced uneven outcomes.  
Financial management is often cited as the most promising area for potential success by states 
(Garland, 2003). For example, in Newark, New Jersey, the state reorganized the district and 
reallocated $26 million geared toward instruction. When the state stepped into Chicago Public 
Schools, an anticipated $4 billion deficit was eliminated. However, equally dramatic academic success 
has been much harder to achieve (Ziebarth, 2002). Academic gains have been mixed at best, most 
often occurring only after multiple years of intervention. Takeovers in Logan County, West Virginia, 
Compton, California, and Chicago, Illinois, are heralded as exceptions that yielded some positive 
academic gains (Garland, 2003). 
In a survey of takeover experiences, Garland (2003) details the early lessons about this last 
resort for low-performing districts: more effective takeovers focus on areas that the state has the 
capacity to influence, such as financial management, eliminating nepotism, or facilities improvement; 
attending to the political elements of takeovers through collaboration, negotiation, and local alliances 
can minimize conflict and resistance; and additional funding, coupled with comprehensive capacity 
building efforts for both teachers and administrators, can yield more positive results. Nevertheless, 
he cautions state actors to avoid authoritarian approaches to takeovers and to be mindful of the 
powerful racial, legal, and political issues that typically accompany these measures. 
Former Compton and current Oakland, California, state administrator, Randolph Ward 
(2004), advocates a comprehensive approach to improving the academic and financial conditions of 
schools or districts in crisis based on lessons learned during his tenure. These strategies include:  
developing innovative initiatives for aggressive teacher recruitment and program development; 
                                                 
7 Studies of Comprehensive School Reform Design implementation have found analogous disparities 
in the quality of services provided. See Murphy and Datnow (2002) for examples of such trends. 
8 For a comprehensive review of the recent research on charter schools, see Bulkley and Wohlstetter 
(2003). 
9 In Philadelphia, charter conversions were part of the remedies for low performing schools, not high 
performing ones, such as those referenced by The Brown Center (2003). 
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implementing safety net programs like Reading Recovery; creating motivational attendance 
programs; organizing accelerated learning programs like full-day kindergarten; providing an extended 
school year; and aligning curriculum with standards-based testing requirements. 
Vouchers. Probably the best known example of vouchers attached to low-performance is the 
state of Florida where students in schools that repeatedly receive an F for their performance can 
attend private schools on a state voucher. The effectiveness of vouchers as a means to increase 
competition for low-performing schools is debated. Greene (2001) evaluated Florida’s A+ program 
and found that low performing schools improve more when they face a challenge from vouchers. 
However, that research has been criticized on methodological grounds (Camilli & Bulkley, 2001). 
Thus, at present we do not have sufficient evidence on vouchers as a corrective action strategy.   
Intervention teams. These are teams that enter schools as authoritative interveners. They are 
charged to evaluate schools, prescribe remedies, and help with implementation. In North Carolina, 
these teams were said to be rather successful (Ladd & Zelli, 2001); in California they worked with 
mixed success, encountering much resistance at the school level (Posnick-Goodwin, 2003). The two 
states differ with regard to both operational principles and context. The North Carolina teams were 
recruited by the state from the ranks of seasoned practitioners and closely worked with schools on 
an almost daily basis. As teachers in North Carolina cannot engage in collective bargaining, teacher 
unions are less of a force. In California, the teams were either third-party providers or county offices 
of education that traditionally were not involved in the day-to-day affairs of regular district schools. 
They were required to be at the schools a minimum of only three times per year (CDE, 2003). Their 
initial intervention was tightly circumscribed and, according to interviews with School Assistance 
and Intervention Team members, tended to eschew instruction.  
In summary, a variety of corrective action strategies have been tried by the examined 
systems, but none stick out as universally effective or robust enough to overcome the power of local 
context. Competence of provider personnel, intervention designs, political power of actors in the 
system, and district and site organizational capacity to absorb the strategies all strongly influence 
how a particular strategy will turn out.  
Staging Should be Handled with Flexibility  
Although NCLB lays out a straightforward three-stage approach, with corrective action and 
school redesign being the second or third steps, respectively, schools that are persistently unable to 
meet AYP are not virgin reform territory for the most part. Many persistently low-performing 
schools are not stable in their stagnation, but volatile and continuously reconstituting in an 
unplanned way. Teacher and administrator turnover is often high, external consultants plentiful and 
ever changing, and district intervention intensified (Mintrop, 2004; Neild & Spiridakis, 2002; Neild 
et al., 2003). In all likelihood, many low-performing schools, unable to meet federal AYP, will have 
previously been subjected to substantial local reform measures. Districts that anticipate state action 
and carry out local school restructuring often move principals and staff, conduct inspections, and 
mandate programs before a school appears on the state or federal radar screen. When that happens, 
schools may have to repeat improvement stages or cycles once they enter federal or state corrective 
action.  
Moreover, a comparison of state systems shows how blurred the lines between the stages are 
in practice. In North Carolina, Kentucky or Florida, the first stage of intervention is already so 
intense that it could classify as corrective action.10 By contrast, California’s persistently low-testing 
                                                 
10 For in-depth descriptions of these systems, see Holdzkom (2001) and SERVE (2001). 
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schools do not even encounter this kind of intensity in the second stage of intervention when they 
are visited by a state assistance and intervention team (“PSAA,” 1999). Kentucky and North 
Carolina do not seem to carry out a significantly different corrective action stage. Maryland 
apparently moved schools from the first stage of local improvement directly into the third stage of 
takeover and governance change (MSDE, 2001). Something similar has happened in Philadelphia 
where a fairly large number of the lowest performing schools will make their journey through the 
NCLB stages as already redesigned schools (Travers, 2003b). As was pointed out above, charter 
schools tend to show up on states’ failing schools lists in larger proportions than regular public 
schools. For these schools as well, fundamental redesign happened before school improvement 
intervention. 
In other words, rather than being distinct stages of intervention intensity, NCLB 
interventions will increasingly look like a deja vu to affected schools unless states design intervention 
approaches that are truly different from all the other things a school has already tried. Such 
approaches need to decrease turbulence, rather than add to it. Thus, instead of rigid staging, states 
and districts need flexibility in designing measures that are appropriate to the developmental needs 
of a given school, an approach that Texas seems to favor.  
Intensive Capacity Building Is Necessary    
Different approaches to capacity building across states’ low-performing schools programs 
can inform the design of powerful interventions for the corrective action stage. Generally, state 
strategies consist of the following elements: 
Additional funds. They are not present in all programs. In some programs the sums are 
negligible; in others they are substantial. 
Evaluation/Audit. These can be short, unstructured visits from state department officials or 
extensive one-week inspections during which the school’s operations are examined 
comprehensively. 
School improvement plans. The requirement that low-performing schools write these plans 
according to state or district templates is a universal feature across all programs. The programs differ 
in the degree to which these plans are reviewed and validated by an external authoritative body and 
in the degree to which their implementation is monitored on site.  
On-site personnel. In the most basic version, they are just monitors of the school 
improvement plan or the general development of the school, the eyes and ears of the state. In some 
programs, they primarily have a helping role. They provide support in analyzing test data, observe 
lessons and give model lessons, help in selecting instructional programs and instructional strategies, 
provide staff development, and give management advice. In some programs, they have a more 
authoritative role as they evaluate teachers and principals, and give reports to governing bodies. 
First-generation accountability systems differed in the degree to which these school level 
oversight and support services were developed. Capacity building intersected with testing rigor, with 
consequences for schools’ performance and the effectiveness of low-performing schools programs. 
We distinguish among four patterns: 
Ambitious state goals without a capacity building strategy. The toughest challenge ahead 
was created by the Maryland system in the 1990s. The system targeted extremely hard cases in 
decline, demanded of schools to adjust to highly complex assessments (which fewer than half the 
state’s student population managed to pass with satisfaction), and set the exit criteria very high. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 13 No. 48 12 
state department limited the burden of the low-performing schools program by capping the number 
of schools at around a hundred (about 7% of all schools) although more schools could have 
qualified according to the state’s criteria. One district, however, was burdened with managing about 
half of its schools as identified low performers. The state did not develop an elaborate capacity 
building structure. State monitors were the eyes and ears of the state. Their role in internal school 
improvement efforts was minimal. Very few low-performing schools managed to exit the program; 
and indeed schools state-wide stagnated until the system was abandoned. In the Maryland case, state 
performance demands were decoupled from existing capacities and with a lack of compensatory 
capacity building, pressures became ineffective or counterproductive. 
Less ambitious and flexible goals pegged to state intervention (and teacher) capacity. Texas 
took an approach that contrasted with that of Maryland in testing rigor, but seemed to exhibit 
similarities regarding capacity building. The state pegged performance demands at levels that were 
within reach for most schools and kept the intervention burden relatively small. In 1995, the system 
identified 267 low-performing schools. The numbers dropped to 59 in 1998, and rose again 
continuously to 150 in 2002 (TEA, 2002), but the thresholds for entrance and exit rose in the 
meantime. With these numbers, the program fluctuated in the 2 to 4% range of the total number of 
schools in the state and tended to exit most identified schools after a short while in the program. 
Texas had a decentralized form of governing schools. Most decisions were made on site, and 
because the state had only limited capacity to support ailing schools, it was indirectly involved in 
providing assistance (Ferguson, 2000). However, the state required low-performing schools and 
districts to compile a school improvement plan. It sent peer review teams to schools and districts 
that visited a school or district for varying lengths of time depending on size of school or district. 
These peer review teams were made up of state department staff and evaluators that received 
training with the help of a CD. In addition, the state organized educational support centers that 
offered their services to low-performing schools and districts, but not exclusively so. Other schools 
in need of support could contact these centers as well. Texas did not furnish additional monetary 
grants to low-performing schools. Only a small number of schools were under more direct 
supervision. As was mentioned above, in the year 2003 only seven schools were visited by monitors 
and two schools supervised by so called masters. Texas, however, had strong mechanisms built into 
its accountability system that identified low-performing districts directly and threatened them with 
further sanctions. 
Thus in Texas, relatively small proportions of schools were identified as low performing. 
Demands on schools were modest and exit criteria within reach. At the same time, the state’s 
support and intervention system was relatively limited. Given that performance demands were more 
closely pegged to existing teacher capacities (because the system challenged schools in the bottom 20 
to 40 percent of the performance distribution with cognitively simple tests), the state could bank on 
a pressure strategy that succeeded by motivating schools to harvest the low-hanging fruit (Mintrop, 
2003).  
Figure 1 illustrates (for performance in 8th grade Reading state-wide) the difference between 
the stagnation of school performance in the Maryland system and the upward trend in the Texas 
system (leaving the issue of exclusion rates aside).11 Both systems elected to refrain from elaborate 
capacity-building features within their low-performing schools programs, but in the Texas case 
upward trends were probably a result of increased pressures around minimum-competency 
                                                 
11 For an analysis of the impact of exclusion rates on Texas achievement patterns, specifically the 
increased rates of failure of students in grade 9 and the increased number of students leaving school before 
high-school graduation, see Haney (2000). 
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standards, a strategy that was pre-empted in the Maryland case by the gulf between school capacity 
and high state demands.    
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Figure 1 
Trends in percent of students meeting standard in Texas and Maryland: Grade 8 reading12 
 
Ambitious state goals, substantial school site grants without focused intervention. California’s 
program experienced a surge of identified low-performing schools. Growth expectations and 
entrance rules for below-average performers were set in such a way that after 3 years the low-
performing schools programs enrolled about 20% of all schools that received an Academic 
Performance Index,13 or about 1,500 schools. The scale of the programs was curtailed by its 
voluntary feature. Being voluntary, schools and districts decided whether they would apply for 
additional funds in return for scrutiny and threats of further interventions. In 2001, only 527 or 56% 
of the 935 eligible schools (for the main program) applied.14 In 2002, of the 1,266 eligible schools, 
only 765 or 60% applied to the program, thus about half of the eligible schools decided to bypass 
the program each year. The state ended up accepting only 430 schools each year for funding 
                                                 
12 From Linn, Baker, and Betebenner (2002). 
13 California’s Academic Performance Index (API) is a numeric index (or scale) that ranges from 200 
to 1000. A school's API score is one indicator of a school's performance level. The statewide API target for 
all schools is 800. A school's growth is measured by how well it is moving toward or past that goal. 
14 There were actually two programs, the main one applying to all schools below the 50th percentile, 
the secondary one targeting only Decile 1 schools. 
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(through its main program). Had all eligible schools been designated, the scale of the program would 
have been enormous. For capacity building the state relied on the massive disbursement of grants 
that were attached to a very loosely constructed oversight structure (Mintrop, 2002). 
Identified schools had to contract with an external evaluator who was chosen from a state-
approved list. Educational reform projects, consultants, county offices of education and later even 
district offices themselves could apply to this list. The state compiled this list based on written 
applications received from these external vendors or agencies. Training in evaluation was not 
provided. The state, however, did require vendors to reapply to the list showing evidence of success. 
The external evaluators negotiated with schools the extent of their fees and services. The state 
provided schools with a $50,000 planning grant that could be used to pay the external evaluator, and 
then another $ 200 per student per year over 2 years that was to pay for capacity building measures 
chosen at the school’s discretion. During these 2 years, the school was expected to have met its 
growth targets. To receive this money, schools were to write a school improvement plan that was at 
first given a cursory review by the state department. Subsequently, this requirement was reduced to a 
short summary of the plan, the full plan being kept on file locally. Thus, in the California case, the 
state department kept a low profile. It relied primarily on grant making at a magnitude far greater 
than most other states we examined, on the capacity of local vendors, the willingness of local 
districts, and the wisdom of schools to spend the money wisely. A management structure facilitating 
quality assurance of the support system was only weakly developed. Reports showed that schools’ 
responses to the program varied widely and depended on the varying quality of external evaluators 
(CDE, 2001; Goe, 2001). A systematic evaluation of the program matching schools enrolled in the 
low-performing schools program with eligible schools that did not enroll showed no effect on test 
scores for the enrolled schools (O'Day & Bitter, 2003). Increased accountability pressures in 
conjunction with substantial grants, relative to other states, did not move these schools on a more 
successful improvement trajectory than low-performing schools that did not receive this treatment. 
Qualitative data suggest that the schools lacked sustained quality support and intervention. 
Medium rigor, small intervention burden with a developed capacity building structure. 
Kentucky is an example of a state that designed its accountability system around performance-based 
tests with high cognitive complexity. In the 1996 to ’98 biennium, the second biennium of the 
systems’ existence, Kentucky entered 250 schools into the low-performing schools program (Cibulka 
& Lindle, 2001). With roughly 1,200 schools in the state, this constituted more than 20% of all 
schools. But these schools were not necessarily academically failing. They had growth deficiencies, 
some on high absolute performance levels. Most of the 250 schools did not continue in the status. 
(Their exit coincided with a redesign of the system (KDE, 2000a), making judgments of 
effectiveness difficult).  In the 2002 accountability cycle, the state identified merely 90 schools as low 
performing or about 7.5% of the total (KDE, 2000b). Only one third of those were required to 
accept state intervention which in Kentucky’s case was intensive.   
Compared to Kentucky, the North Carolina system, with growth expectations pegged to 
average state growth, yielded a smaller number of identified low-performing schools from its 
inception. When the state began its ABC tests in the 1996/’97 school year, 123 K–8 schools were 
identified (7.5% of total). A year later, that number was reduced to only 15 low-performing K–8 
schools (0.9%). In subsequent years, the numbers remained low, though they rose again to 44 
schools in the 1999–2000 school year, with high schools now being included. But this still 
constituted no more than about 2% of all schools (NCDPI, 2002). Thus, the North Carolina 
situation was characterized by a relatively light load of low-performing schools that was consistently 
held low. Nevertheless, the state’s support structure was intensive. 
Of the state programs we surveyed, Kentucky and North Carolina had fairly elaborate 
systems in place that provided oversight and support to schools under direct supervision from the 
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state department. Services were sustained over one school year or longer, and specifically targeted to 
low-performing schools achieving state goals. As part of the state’s support for its schools in need of 
assistance, Kentucky provided modest additional school improvement funds. In the 2002–2003 year, 
$2 million was budgeted for the 90 schools. For example, elementary school grants ranged from 
$12,000–$38,000 per biennium. 
A school inspection was conducted by state-sponsored Scholastic Audit Teams, which 
included a Highly Skilled Educator (HSE), a teacher, a principal or other administrator, a parent, and 
a university-based educator (KDE, 2000a). The audit teams were trained for their task. The audit 
teams visited each school for about a week. Once the scholastic audit was conducted, schools used 
the results to write their school improvement plans. The lowest category of performers (Level III) 
received mandated assistance from an HSE for the entire biennium; the others received voluntary 
assistance. School plans were written with the help of the designated HSE and were submitted to the 
state department for review and approval. A state-certified person other than the HSE also 
conducted an evaluation of school personnel at all Level III schools. Principals at all three levels 
were required to participate in staff development to enhance leadership skills. 
HSEs had to demonstrate prior ability to bring about high levels of student performance and 
went through a rigorous hiring and training process. Each HSE received two weeks of training and 
follow-up training at quarterly meetings. Mentors from the state department provided assistance in 
problem solving and support to HSEs. HSEs were expected to serve on-site at least 80% of their 
work time. Their activities included but were not limited to: staff development, classroom 
observations of instruction, demonstration lessons, grants writing, tutoring, and creation of model 
lessons (David et al., 2003; Holdzkom, 2001). In addition, a team of HSEs that specialized in 
organizational management was formed and could be assigned to more than one school at a time, 
given the needs of a particular school. In the 2002–2003 school year, there were 52 HSEs working 
with 30 Level III schools and providing support to others on a voluntary basis.  
Quite a bit of research has been focused on the effectiveness and impact of the HSE (or as it 
was previously called Distinguished Educator) program. The majority of it speaks to its success as a 
capacity building tool in low-performing schools. According to one study, the DE program had a 
significant impact on test scores and school culture (David et al., 2000; Holdzkom, 2001). A 
reported key focus of the work of the HSE was curriculum and instructional alignment to the 
instructionally complex state assessments. Test score data show that schools that participated in the 
DE/HSE program improved at a higher rate than those that did not (Kannapel & Coe, 2000), 
although it is difficult to isolate the impact of HSEs in the whole school environment. Significant 
challenges for the program were sustaining the change once HSE had left school grounds, creating 
an appropriate match between the HSE and the school, and maintaining a strong pool of HSEs 
(David et al., 2000).  
In North Carolina, no additional funds were allocated to low-performing schools, but these 
schools received intensive oversight and support. Low-performing schools were assigned an external 
assistance team made up of one administrator and three or four teachers with experience at the 
grade span of the school being served. Each team worked with a school for one academic year on a 
daily basis. The teams’ tasks were similar to the ones HSEs in Kentucky carried out. In addition, 
they reported to the local school board or the state department on the school's progress. 
Assistance team members participated in a 4-week comprehensive training in topics similar 
to those in Kentucky. In addition, the assistance teams could participate in 2 extra weeks of training 
in a program specifically designed to reduce minority achievement gaps and were encouraged to go 
to conferences regarding specific subject areas or grade-level content. A team of five people working 
at the state level provided technical assistance to assistance teams. In the 2000–2001 school year, the 
state employed 80–85 assistance team members and served a total of 52 schools, with 14 schools 
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receiving a mandated assistance team. An inquiry by the state department has revealed that assisting 
schools in data analysis, modeling good instruction, and aligning the schools’ curricula to state 
curricula and assessments was instrumental in moving schools on the path to improvement. 
Goals, program scale and capacity building strategies. High-quality support and oversight 
need to be an integral part of a low-performing schools program in both the school improvement 
and corrective action stages. The need for strong support grows in proportion to performance 
demands. 
 Some programs handle a fairly modest load of cases, stress support over sanctions, 
supervise this support centrally, and manage recruitment and training of personnel and quality 
control of services. Services are geared toward the comprehensive reform of schools with a focus on 
the state’s managerial requirements and performance goals. The low-performing schools program 
operates in the context of an accountability system with modestly complex performance demands 
and a high level of guidance by way of a state core curriculum. But at the same time, on-site support 
providers adapt their intervention to individual school needs, though curriculum and instructional 
alignment are key points of intervention. We saw such patterns most clearly in the programs from 
the small states of Kentucky and North Carolina. 
A program design that places demands for high instructional complexity on schools, 
identifies rock-bottom performers with very low organizational capacity to begin with, establishes a 
high exit threshold, and leaves it up to (overburdened) districts to provide necessary capacity 
building runs into trouble even when it keeps the statewide load of identified schools fairly small. 
We saw tendencies of such a pattern in the original Maryland program where very few schools 
indeed have been exiting the system successfully. 
A program design that identifies large numbers of below-average schools on the basis of a 
set performance ceiling and fixed growth expectations; stresses grant making over accountability; 
leaves it up to districts to provide capacity building, but does not make these districts direct 
recipients of accountability measures; relies on a network of external consultants for evaluation and 
intervention, but has a very weak management structure at the state level in place that could assure 
quality of services; such a design runs into trouble. We saw tendencies of such a pattern in the 
implementation of the California accountability system. Indeed only about a fourth of the first 
cohort of identified schools met the state’s originally stated expectations, and overall the program 
showed no effect on test scores over 3 years. If past accounts of educational reform are an 
indication, provision of money, even generous grants, without a clear focus on goals and strategies 
to achieve them will not be very effective.  
By contrast, Texas is an example of a system that refrains from grant making, compels 
districts into action through strong district accountability and augments with generic regional 
services, but this rather austere model of capacity building functions in the context of modest and 
flexible performance demands. The problem with such a system, however, is that it may encourage 
teaching to a cognitively basic test in highly pressured schools.   
Whether support and oversight is provided directly by the state or through third-party 
consultants, low-performing schools programs need a management structure that allows for careful 
recruitment and quality control of service providers. Compared to some of the first-generation 
accountability systems, the heavy emphasis of NCLB on intervention in the first 3 years of a 
school’s identification highlights the importance of effective and focused intervention, especially 
when coupled with ambitious performance goals. Even low-performing schools programs on a small 
scale designed for the first stage of school improvement required elaborate capacity building 
structures. For the corrective action stage, these requirements increase manifold. 
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A Comprehensive Set of Strategies Seems Promising 
If there is one characteristic that stands out from systems that keep the number of low 
performing schools low and make a consistent difference in their lowest performing schools, it is 
comprehensiveness. For example, Florida uses a comprehensive approach to corrective action 
schools that includes professional development, instructional support, work on test preparation, 
help with assessment, extended school days, and parent in-services.15  In Kentucky, intervention 
starts off with a comprehensive week-long scholastic audit based on 9 standards and 88 indicators. 
Highly Skilled Educators (HSEs) are assigned to schools and expected to be on-site at least 80% of 
the time during their two years at the school. David et al. found that HSEs’ activities are 
“remarkably similar across the sample schools” (2003, p. 10). They fall into the following categories:  
professional development, curriculum alignment, classroom instruction, test preparation, leadership, 
school organization and decision-making, and resource procurement.  These categories are similar to 
those used in the Scholastic Audit. North Carolina uses a similarly encompassing approach. When 
intervention teams enter the school, they evaluate all educators in the school and can recommend 
dismissing anyone who does not improve at the end of the year (SERVE, 2001). Among other 
things, they conduct classroom observations, work closely with principals, conduct model lessons, 
and streamline budgets. The schools are required to implement the team’s corrective actions.  Team 
members participate in a 4-week training on data analysis, cultural diversity, curriculum alignment, 
teacher performance and evaluation, and team building (Holdzkom, 2001). 
The Chancellor’s District in New York City, emulated by other inner-city districts, was a 
similarly comprehensive approach to persistently low-testing schools, but added to the mix a 
supportive district structure that acted as a surrogate for schools’ dysfunctional home district 
(Snipes, Doolittle, & Herlihy, 2002). Intervention in the special district consisted of the following 
elements (Phenix, Siegel, Zaltsman, & Fruchter, 2005): reduced class size; extended school day and 
year; after-school programs; mandated instructional programs, schedules, and curricula; prescribed 
professional development, with at least four on-site staff developers; extra time; a teacher center and 
teacher specialist assigned to each school; student assessments; supervisory/district support; 
restaffing and replacement of most principals and many ineffective teachers; more intense 
monitoring and mentoring ; and incentives for recruiting qualified teachers (e.g., signing bonuses). 
Researchers and interviewed program administrators point to two factors that in their minds 
made a key difference: the special district removed a school from a failing district and put it in a very 
nurturing one, and a comprehensive set of organizational, curricular, instructional and personnel 
interventions were given to schools as a bundle, avoiding isolated quick fixes (Phenix et al., 2005). 
However, even with this intense intervention, preliminary data suggest that Chancellor’s District 
schools achieved only moderate improvement in student performance; only half of the enrolled 
schools were removed from the state list of low-performing schools; and one-fifth had to be closed. 
Yet, overall fourth graders in the special district outperformed SURR schools in reading, i.e. those 
schools enrolled in the state’s low-performing schools program, even when controlling for student 
and school characteristics, teacher resources and per student expenditures (Phenix et al., 2005).  
In summary, it appears that comprehensiveness is a key characteristic that makes 
interventions sufficiently different from all the other things that schools have tried before and that 
makes corrective action programs effective. Comprehensiveness includes interventions at the school 
                                                 
15 For more descriptions of Florida’s accountability system, see SERVE (2001) and the Florida 
Department of Education’s Bureau of School Improvement website at http://www.bsi.fsu.edu/.  
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and district levels. But even these comprehensive approaches cannot overcome some of the 
performance barriers that exist in the highest-need and lowest-capacity schools and districts. 
Relationship-Building Needs to Complement Powerful Programs  
Many low-performing schools are not attractive work places, and under current labor market 
conditions, low-performing schools are often staffed with lower-skilled teachers and large numbers 
of new, insufficiently trained teachers with low commitment to stay (Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 
2002). Principal turnover is high as well. Principals under pressure of accountability often act as 
conduits of pressure, making for unsupportive working relationships between teachers and 
administration (LeCompte & Dworkin, 1991). Mintrop found that in schools improving in the low-
performing schools program principal leadership and faculty collegiality and cohesion as well as trust 
in the skills of colleagues were stronger (Mintrop, 2004). Bryk and Schneider point to the 
importance of trust among administrators, teachers, and parents as a key resource for school 
improvement (Bryk & Schneider, 2002). O’Day (2004) found that initial capacity was a key factor in 
explaining why some schools improved when targeted by low-performing schools programs and 
others did not. Elementary schools with higher “peer collaboration, teacher-teacher trust, and 
collective responsibility for student learning” responded more favorably (p. 26). Creation, or 
“renewal of teachers’ commitment to the school,” is one of the most salient issues a school needs to 
address, according to an English report that summarizes insights from inspection reports on 900 
schools “under special measures,” the English equivalent to schools under corrective action (Gray, 
2000, p. 20). 
Under corrective action, districts and states intervene deeply into the core of a school’s 
operation, often mandating specific programs and prescribing specific operations that can be 
monitored fairly easily. Implementation of effective programs is desirable and especially necessary 
when schools are staffed with many insufficiently qualified teachers. Under the pressures of 
corrective action, however, such implementation raises the specter of compliance, managerial 
control, and programmatic standardization as the main levers of school improvement. Following the 
lead of the above cited literature, implementation of powerful programs ought not come at the 
expense of developing professional norms of high expectations and trusting relationships. Such 
norms are not only necessary for teachers to collectively assume responsibility for student learning, 
but are important in fostering and maintaining teacher commitment to stay. Moreover, if the 
capacity of individuals to interact with and rely on each other is a key ingredient for schools to 
respond positively to performance challenges, then interventions that incorporate work on internal 
organizational norms and building trust may be a good way to improve on that front.  
Governance changes, for example the installation of an EMO, are often accompanied by 
heightened political conflict around new relationships of authority and may lead to a decline in social 
stability.16 Redesigns have the potential of actually diminishing a school’s social capacity (Malen et 
al., 2002). Intervention strategies need to compensate for these negative consequences of social 
disruption. Thus, corrective action and redesign strategies need to create a balanced effect on 
instructional programs, educators’ professional norms of performance, commitment to stay in the 
low-performing school, and trust among school actors. Such balance is apt to stabilize the low-
performing school. 
                                                 
16 For analyses of how EMO management was associated with the social instability of Philadelphia 
schools, see Neild and Spiridakis (2002) and Neild at al. (2003). 
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Competence Reduces Conflict 
When schools enter the stage of corrective action, they are no longer able to heal themselves 
and improve solely based on their own internal strengths. Rather, they are in need of external change 
agents who can provide new tools, such as programs, coaching, advice, and facilitation. While in the 
first stage of school improvement, state pressure and the signaling of urgency may increase schools’ 
motivation to marshal their own forces; in the corrective action stage pressure takes a back seat to 
capacity building. Something essential needs to be added to a school under corrective action that it 
previously lacked. We argued earlier that this “something” is not an isolated quick fix (e.g., a 
program, a governance change, a principal change, etc.), but a set of strategies that comprehensively 
integrates the technical and social layers of the organization. 
To provide such a collection of strategies with sufficient high quality requires the careful 
recruitment of highly skilled intervention personnel. This is a key challenge for all systems we 
examined. Supply of high quality personnel is a theme that runs through many reports and 
interviews, regardless of the specific models or structures that are implemented.17  In California, 
schools complained about a lack of powerful expertise on the part of the state’s new school 
intervention teams (Posnick-Goodwin, 2003). In Philadelphia, the strength of district or EMO-
based restructuring seems to rely on the ability of the entity in charge to recruit skillful and 
committed educators (principals, teachers, staff developers, instructional specialists, etc.) to the 
schools.  Where they fail to do so, or are not empowered to do so by regulations as in Philadelphia, 
the effort may be undermined irrespective of the specific governance structure.  
The uneven service quality of third-party consultants in a number of systems was already 
mentioned. North Carolina and Kentucky recruit school practitioners with a track record of 
leadership in their schools and districts in order to insure proximity to the people that need to be 
reached by interventions. It has been a challenge for Kentucky to find enough highly qualified 
candidates for the job of Highly Skilled Educator year after year, as previous cohorts return to their 
districts. The shortage of educators with these skills is evident in the frequent complaint from 
districts that HSEs are sorely missed in the district’s own operations (David et al., 2003).     
When external interveners enter schools without a strong base of competence, problems 
arise. Schools complain of serving two masters (Blanc, 2003; Bulkley, Mundell, & Riffer, 2004). 
Traditional lines of authority are more likely to clash with new ones, for example state-empowered 
external interveners, when new authority is not backed up and legitimized by new ideas, new 
capacities, or new services that promise to be a benefit to the school.18 In other words, before states 
(or districts) decide to send new intervention teams, external partners, EMOs, etc. as authoritative 
executors of corrective action into persistently low-performing schools, they should be sure about 
the providers’ potential to offer comprehensive services with competence. These services need to 
make a marked difference in schools that in many instances “have tried it all before.”   
Strong State Commitment Is Needed to Create System Capacity 
Corrective action and school redesign cannot be done on the cheap. We know from first-
generation accountability systems that merely mandating new programs, subjecting a school to zero-
                                                 
17 Some examples of this theme include the experiences in Chicago (Hess, 2003) and Philadelphia 
(Neild & Spiridakis, 2002; Neild et al., 2003). 
18 For examples where external agents conflict with traditional lines of authority, see Garland (2003) 
and Posnick-Goodwin (2003). 
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based staffing as in reconstitution, pairing it up with external consultants, or passing it on to new 
management will not be sufficient for those persistently low-performing schools that have high 
needs and low capacity to begin with (Mintrop & Papazian, 2003). Successful states and districts 
show that highly competent personnel and comprehensive intervention capacity are not readily 
available and have to be developed over time. Particularly, corrective action in district 
administrations seems to be virgin territory for many states. 
As NCLB implementation progresses through the stages of corrective action and school 
redesign, more schools and districts will have to be targeted and states’ efforts need to grow. But 
recent fiscal problems in many states and districts make a vigorous state effort doubtful (Richard, 
2004). Comprehensive programs (for example, New York’s Chancellor’s District, Kentucky’s Highly 
Skilled Educators program, and North Carolina’s Assistance Team program) have seen cuts. Some 
states have stopped expanding their programs or retrenched (such as California). Poorer states, such 
as Mississippi or Alabama, have been unable to pay for assistance to all of their highest-need 
schools, let alone pay for the development of a school improvement infrastructure that NCLB 
implementation will require. The gap between what is federally required for successful corrective 
action and redesign and what states are able or willing to offer at this point is large in many 
instances. New ways of financing systems’ capacity for providing comprehensive and highly 
competent interventions need to be found.     
Conclusion 
The eight lessons learned from first-generation accountability systems can be condensed into 
one final lesson for the implementation of NCLB. First-generation attempts have shown that the 
task of continuous school improvement requires a sophisticated school improvement infrastructure 
of high quality that comprehensively ‘moves on all fronts’ and goes beyond incentives, sanctions, 
and even additional grants for capacity building. Yet, NCLB has magnified the challenge even 
further. The more stringent corrective action requirements of the law are likely to create larger 
intervention burdens for states than many of the previous systems examined in this paper.19 The 
high-stakes features of the law have been called bold by supporters and draconian by detractors. But 
compared to the enormous challenges of the task, we conclude from our data on first-generation 
accountability systems that even the law’s presumably rigorous corrective action features tinker on 
the margins. The corrective action incentives and sanctions no doubt can cause movement among 
responsible actors on all levels of the system. But if the law is implemented in the tradition of 
procedural compliance, it will produce much commotion and comparatively little improvement. The 
enormity of the task at hand requires the federal government, states, districts, and schools to go far 
beyond NCLB and proactively search for powerful, high quality and comprehensive ways of reform 
and institution rebuilding.  
Alternatively, states could reduce testing rigor or keep rigor down. As demands are pegged 
to existing capacities, a pressure strategy seems more promising and intensive (and expensive) 
capacity building expendable. Basic literacy and numeracy may rise in such a system by limiting and 
committing schools in the lower performing spectrum to cognitively simple instruction (at least in 
the short or medium time frame). First-generation systems such as the ones in Maryland and 
California show that ambitious performance goals without a well-structured and well-supported 
capacity building strategy create ineffective low-performing schools programs with undesirable 
political consequences. Conversely, a system that banks on pressures to teach to a cognitively simple 
                                                 
19 For more on this topic, see Mintrop and Papazian (2003). 
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test may confront us with the undesirable trade-off between the ends of achieving basic literacy and 
numeracy by means of severely curtailing the spectrum of educational goals. Accountability systems 
designed in the medium range of cognitive complexity with modest pressures and reasonably 
elaborate capacity building structures may be a good start. 
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